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Abstract: We propose a Bayesian pseudo posterior mechanism to gener-
ate record-level synthetic datasets equipped with an (, δ)− probabilistic
differential privacy (pDP) guarantee from any proposed synthesis model.
The pseudo posterior mechanism employs a data record-indexed, risk-based
weight vector with weights ∈ [0, 1] to surgically downweight high-risk records
for the generation and release of record-level synthetic data. The probabilis-
tic differentially private pseudo posterior synthesizer constructs weights us-
ing Lipschitz bounds under a log-pseudo likelihood utility for each data
record, which provides a practical, general formulation for using weights
based on record-level sensitivities that we show achieves dramatic improve-
ments in the pDP expenditure as compared to the unweighted posterior
mechanism. By selecting weights to remove likelihood contributions with
non-finite log-likelihood values, we achieve a local privacy guarantee at ev-
ery sample size. We compute a local sensitivity specific to our Consumer Ex-
penditure Surveys dataset for family income, published by the U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics, and reveal mild conditions that guarantee its asymptotic
contraction to a global sensitivity result over the space of databases under
a pDP formal privacy framework. We show that utility is better preserved
for our pseudo posterior mechanism as compared to the exponential mech-
anism (EM) estimated on the same non-private synthesizer due to the use
of targeted downweighting. Our results may be applied to any synthesizing
model envisioned by the data disseminator in a computationally tractable
way that only involves estimation of a pseudo posterior distribution for pa-
rameter(s) θ, unlike recent approaches that use naturally-bounded utility
functions under application of the EM.
Keywords and phrases: Primary Differential privacy, Pseudo posterior,
Pseudo posterior mechanism, Synthetic data.
0
imsart-ejs ver. 2020/08/06 file: ppmdp_EJS_082120.tex date: September 4, 2020
ar
X
iv
:1
90
9.
11
79
6v
6 
 [s
tat
.M
E]
  3
 Se
p 2
02
0
Savitsky, Williams, Hu/Bayesian Pseudo Posterior under Differential Privacy 1
1. Introduction
Privacy protection is an important research topic, which attracts attention from
government statistical agencies and private companies alike. A popular approach
focuses on encoding privacy protection to a summary function or statistic, f ,
composed from record-level data, through the addition of noise proportional to
the “sensitivity”, S(f), of the statistic, defined as the supremum of the change
in value of the statistic from the inclusion or exclusion of a single data record
over the space of databases. Dwork et al. [6] construct a mechanism that em-
ploys a Laplace-distributed perturbation of a target statistic. The mechanism,
which produces the resultant statistic, achieves a privacy guarantee under the
differential privacy (DP) framework. The guarantee is represented by a privacy
budget , some of which is expended for each query a user makes through the
mechanism to the underlying, closely-held (by the statistical agency) database.
A related approach to privacy protection is the release of a synthetic record-
level database, proposed by Rubin [14] and Little [9], and has been extensively
researched on ever since. This approach replaces the closely-held (by the statis-
tical agency) database with a synthetically generated record-level database. The
synthetic database is released to the public who would use it to conduct any
analyses of which they would conceive to be conducted on the real, confidential
record-level data. As a result of releasing a synthetic database encoded with
privacy protection, the synthetic data approach replaces multiple queries per-
formed on a summary statistic with the publication of the synthetic database,
such that the synthetic data approach is independent of the specific queries
performed by users or putative intruders.
Dimitrakakis et al. [5] demonstrate theoretical results for the Bayesian pos-
terior distribution, which may be employed as a mechanism for synthetic data
generation; specifically, if the log-likelihood is Lipschitz continuous with bound
∆ over the space of databases, x ∈ Xn (the space of databases of size, n)
and the space of parameters, θ ∈ Θ, then the posterior mechanism achieves
an  = 2∆−DP guarantee for each posterior draw of θ, the model parame-
ter(s); however, Dimitrakakis et al. [5] acknowledge that computing a finite ∆,
in practice, under the use of the log-likelihood is particularly difficult for an un-
bounded parameter space. They specify relatively simple Bayesian probability
models where the Lipschitz bound is analytically available. Even in this simple
model setting Dimitrakakis et al. [5] require truncation of the support of the
prior distribution to achieve a finite ∆. Relatively simply-constructed differen-
tially private Bayesian synthesizers are similarly proposed by Machanavajjhala
et al. [10], Abowd and Vilhuber [1], McClure and Reiter [12] and Bowen and Liu
[4]. The utility performance to preserve the real data distribution in the pub-
lished synthetic data of these simple posterior mechanisms under a truncated
prior support may be severely compromised by truncation and over-smoothing
(induced by simple, parametric prior distributions).
A common approach for generating parameter draws for θ is the exponen-
tial mechanism (EM) of McSherry and Talwar [13], which inputs a non-private
mechanism for θ and generates θ in such a way that induces an −DP guarantee
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on the overall mechanism. The EM is conditioned on the availability of a global
sensitivity over the space of databases, ∆u for some utility function, u(x, θ),
defined on the space of databases and the space of parameters, globally.
Definition 1. The exponential mechanism releases values of θ from a distribu-
tion proportional to,
exp (u(x, θ)) , (1)
where u(x, θ) is a utility function. Let
∆u = supx∈Xn supx,y:δ(x,y)=1 supθ∈Θ |u(x, θ)− u(y, θ)| be the sensitivity, de-
fined globally over x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Xn, the σ−algebra of datasets, x, governed
by product measure, Pθ0 ; δ(x,y) = #{i : xi 6= yi} is the Hamming distance be-
tween x,y ∈ Xn. Then each draw of θ from the exponential mechanism satisfies
 = 2∆u−DP.
In order to set an arbitrary  6= 2∆u, we must modify the utility function
u(x, θ). The simplest and most common approach is to rescale it: u∗(x, θ) =

2∆u
u(x, θ) [See 13, 6, among many others]; however, we will show in the se-
quel that updating or redefining the utility function via a more general and
flexible approach can lead to better utility for the same level of privacy .
In particular we consider a utility function that is a sum of potentially non-
identical, record-indexed functions u(x, θ) =
∑n
i ui(xi, θ) and we adjust the
individual components ui(xi, θ) rather than the global sum. We accomplish this
u∗i (xi, θ) = αiui(xi, θ) where αi ∈ [0, 1] selectively downweight utility contribu-
tions for records that express high disclosure risk.
The EM inputs a global utility function and its sensitivity constructed as
the supremum of the utility over the space of data, Xn, and, simultaneously,
the parameter space, Θ. Wasserman and Zhou [19] and Snoke and Slavkovic
[16] construct utility functions (e.g., the Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance between
the empirical distributions of the real and synthetic datasets) that are natu-
rally bounded over all x ∈ Xn, resolving the challenge of using the potentially
unbounded log-likelihood as the utility function. Although the use of a natu-
rally bounded utility resolves the issue of truncating the data and parameter
spaces, there is a large, and perhaps intractable, computational cost to the use of
these naturally bounded utilities to draw samples of θ from the distribution con-
structed from the EM; for example, Snoke and Slavkovic [16] must compute their
pMSE utility statistic multiple times for each proposed value, θˆl (l = 1, · · · , L),
under a Metropolis-Hastings algorithm used to draw samples under the EM.
Furthermore, Snoke and Slavkovic [16] assume the existence of some synthesiz-
ing distribution, g(θˆ), from which to draw synthetic data, is needed to compute
their pMSE. In practice, g will be defined as the posterior predictive distribu-
tion, g(X | x, θˆl), which means the posterior distribution must be repeatedly
estimated for each draw from of θ from the EM.
This paper extends the pseudo posterior synthesizer of Hu and Savitsky [8]
to an alternative mechanism (to the EM) as a practical means of achieving
a Lipschitz (global to the space of databases and parameters) that, in turn,
guarantees an (, δ)− probabilistic DP [11] level of privacy without parameter
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truncation under richly-parameterized probability models. Hu and Savitsky [8]
design a record-indexed weight αi ∈ [0, 1], which is set to be inversely propor-
tional to their construction for the identification risk probability of record, i; a
data record that expresses a relatively high probability of identification disclo-
sure will receive a likelihood weight, αi, that is closer to 0, while a data record
with a low disclosure probability will receive a likelihood weight, αi, that is
closer to 1. The vector weights α = (α1, · · · , αn) are subsequently applied to
the likelihood function of all n records to form the pseudo posterior,
ξα (θ | x, γ) ∝
[
n∏
i=1
p (xi | θ)αi
]
ξ (θ | γ) , (2)
where θ denotes the model parameters, γ denotes the model hyperparameters
and ξ(·) denotes the prior distribution. This construction employs a data record-
indexed, risk-based weight vector with weights ∈ [0, 1] to surgically downweight
high-risk records in estimation of a pseudo posterior distribution for θ, sub-
sequently used to generate and release a synthetic record-level database. The
authors show that this selective downweighting of records reduces the average of
by-record risks as compared to an unweighted synthesis, while inducing only a
minor reduction in utility. Hu and Savitsky [8] base their risk measure on a cal-
culated probability of identification for a record. They cast a radius around the
true data value for each record and count the number of record values that lie
outside of the radius, which directly measures the extent that the target record
is isolated and, therefore, easier for an intruder to discover by random guessing.
While their risk measure appeals to intuition, it is based on an assumption about
the behavior of a putative intruder. By contrast, the DP framework makes no
explicit assumptions about the behavior or knowledge of an intruder.
1.1. Introducing the Vector-weighted Pseudo Posterior Mechanism
Let ∆xi be the supremum of | log p(xi | θ)| over the parameter space (θ ∈ Θ).
This supremum bound is referred to as a Lipschitz bound for each xi, i ∈
(1, . . . , n). The bound represents the sensitivity of the record i to identifica-
tion disclosure. We construct a vector-weighted pseudo posterior mechanism by
setting each weight, αi ∝ 1/∆xi in Equation (2), where αi is linearly stan-
dardized to lie ∈ [0, 1]. We then estimate the vector-weighted pseudo posterior,
ξα (θ | x, γ).
Once we have estimated ξα, we compute ∆α,xi as the supremum of | log p(xi |
θ)αi | over θ ∈ Θ, where the α subscript in ∆α,xi indicates that the Lipschitz
bound is computed from the log-pseudo likelihood. From this collection of by-
record Lipschitz bounds computed on the log pseudo likelihoods, we construct
∆α,x as the maximum of the (∆α,xi)i=1,...,n. Finally, we formulate the Lipschitz
bound for the mechanism as ∆α as the supremum of (∆α,x) over all x ∈ Xn,
which is a sensitivity measure of our log-pseudo likelihood utility function used
to construct our pseudo posterior mechanism, ξα (θ | x, γ), that we proposed
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to use for the generation of synthetic data with an − DP privacy guarantee.
We extend Dimitrakakis et al. [5] to establish a direct functional association
between the Lipschitz bound, ∆α, of the pseudo posterior mechanism and the
( = 2∆α)− DP guarantee provided by the vector-weighted pseudo posterior
mechanism; in particular, we indirectly set the  through directly setting the
pseudo likelihood privacy weights, α, that in turn determines the Lipschitz,
∆α. We may set α to more aggressively downweight high risk records, which
would lower the resulting ∆α and .
In the EM of McSherry and Talwar [13], ∆ is the (global) sensitivity of
utility, u(x, θ), over all x ∈ Xn and θ ∈ Θ. The EM samples a distribution
proportional to exp(u(x, θ)) and produces an  = 2∆. The data provider selects
a target  under EM by rescaling, u(x, θ) to u∗(x, θ) = (/2∆)× u(x, θ). (Sim-
ilarly, Dwork et al. [6] scales scales additive noise by ∆/ for some statistic of
interest). Our approach is more general by using a vector of scale weights, α,
to accomplish a re-scaling for the purpose of achieving a target . We construct
u(x, θ) =
∑n
i=1 ui(x, θ) that we rescale to u
∗(x, θ) =
∑n
i=1 αi × ui(x, θ). Our
by-record re-scaling is more surgical and targeted, which will produce a ∆α and
an  = 2∆α where not only is ∆α < ∆ (to achieve a desired ) but vector
weighting by α more efficiently reduces risk than the EM by surgically target-
ing high risk records. Unlike the EM that sets  directly, however, we indirectly
set our  through directly setting disclosure risk weights, α that determines
∆α and  = 2∆α. We reveal by simulation and in application that our pseudo
posterior mechanism produces a risk-utility curve that dominates the EM in
terms of producing improved utility in the synthetic data for an equivalent −
DP guarantee because our mechanism surgically downweights highly sensitive
records while we show that the EM downweights all records by the same scalar
weight set to the worst case sensitivity among the n records.
We refer to a “local” Lipschitz, ∆α,x, and privacy guarantee over the space
of parameters, but limited to a single, observed application database, x. By
contrast, we use the term “global” to refer to a Lipschitz bound, ∆α, and a
global privacy guarantee that is based on the supremum over all databases in
the space; that is, the supremum over the local Lipschitz bounds. We use the
term, “global DP guarantee” as synonymous with − DP guarantee.
We further demonstrate in the sequel that our local DP guarantee tied to
an observed database asymptotically contracts on a global (, δ)− probabilis-
tic differential privacy (pDP) guarantee where δ represents the probability of
a breach of global − differential privacy. Our asymptotic result provides con-
ditions that guarantee that δ contracts on 0 as the sample size, n, increases.
We compute a local Lipschitz bound, ∆α,x, specific to our application (e.g., to
a Consumer Expenditure Surveys (CE) sample), x, and reveal conditions that
guarantee its contraction to a global Lipschitz, ∆α, over all x ∈ Xn (across all
potential datasets of size n) as n increases. Our new mechanism may be applied
to any synthesizing mechanism envisioned by the data provider in a compu-
tationally tractable way that only involves a routine estimation of a pseudo
posterior distribution for θ.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 generalizes
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an unweighted Lipschitz assumption to a weighted Lipschitz assumption that
directly ties to an − DP privacy result for our proposed pseudo posterior mech-
anism. In Section 3, we describe the computation details to produce a matrix
of (absolute values for) log-likelihoods estimated for the n records and S pa-
rameter draws taken from the unweighted posterior mechanism and their sub-
sequent use to formulate a vector of record-indexed weights, α, for a single
observed database, x. We then discuss the procedure to use the α to estimate
the pseudo posterior distribution and computation of the local Lipchitz bound
for the pseudo posterior mechanism. This section additionally enumerates the
connection between the scalar-weighted pseudo posterior mechanism and the
EM. Section 4 proposes two alternate approaches for achieving a global Lips-
chitz bound and, hence, a global privacy guarantee. Firstly, we specify formal
conditions that guarantee the contraction of a local Lipschitz bound to the
global Lipschitz bound (and the global DP guarantee). We include a Monte
Carlo simulation study that generates a collection of local databases and shows
that the infimum and supremum local Lipschitz bounds collapse together as n
approaches 1000. Secondly, we formulate a non-asymptotic result that censors
the log-pseudo likelihood at a threshold chosen based on a local Lipschitz bound
for an observed database to lock-in that local bound as a global bound. Sec-
tion 5 focuses on our application to synthesizing the family income variable in
the CE sample, and presents the risk and utility profiles of locally differentially
private synthetic data generated under the proposed pseudo posterior mecha-
nism, compared to other competing methods. We conclude with a discussion in
Section 6.
2. Differential Privacy for the Pseudo Posterior
In this section, we generalize the connection between achieving a global Lipschitz
bound, ∆α, and an − DP (or global DP) guarantee from the unweighted poste-
rior distribution of Dimitrakakis et al. [5], on the one hand, to the risk-weighted,
pseudo posterior distribution of Equation (2), which defines our privacy mech-
anism, on the other hand. We further re-purpose a result from Wasserman and
Zhou [19] to extend a global DP guarantee for the mechanism generating param-
eters, θ, to the pseudo posterior predictive mechanism for generating synthetic
data that is based on integrating with respect to the globally DP privacy guar-
anteed pseudo posterior distribution mechanism (used to generate the model
parameters). After having shown that achievement of a global Lipschitz pro-
duces a global DP privacy guarantee for a pseudo posterior mechanism, we
discuss constructing by-record weights used in our pseudo posterior mechanism
that are designed to be inversely proportional to the (absolute value of) log-
likelihood utilities computed over the parameter space. The record-indexed vec-
tor of weights, α = (α1, . . . , αn) is used to compute an α− weighted pseudo
likelihood shown in Equation (2) for every database in the space of databases
of size n, Xn, that determines the global Lipschitz bound, ∆α. The global Lip-
schitz bound, in turn, provides an ( = 2∆α)− DP privacy guarantee. So  is
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set, indirectly, through the specifications for weights, α, under our Bayesian
formulation.
2.1. Preliminaries
We begin by constructing the probability space, (Θ, βΘ), equipped with prior
distribution, ξ(θ). Observe a database sequence, x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Xn under
x1, . . . , xn
ind∼ Pθ0 , for some θ0 ∈ Θ, we formulate the pseudo likelihood,
pαθ (x) =
n∏
i=1
pθi(xi)
αi(x), (3)
for each θ ∈ Θ and x ∈ Xn. The pseudo likelihood exponentiates likelihood
contributions by α(x) = (α1(x), . . . , αn(x)), where αi(x) ∈ [0, 1] denote weights
that are constructed to be inversely proportional to the local identification risk
for each observed dataset record, and are used to selectively downweight the
likelihood contributions for records that express relatively high identification
disclosure risks.
Given the prior and pseudo likelihood, we construct the pseudo posterior
distribution,
ξα(B | x) =
∫
θ∈B p
α
θ (x)dξ(θ)
φα(x)
=
∫
θ∈B e
−rn,α(θ,θ∗)dξ(θ)∫
θ∈Θ e
−rn,α(θ,θ∗)dξ(θ)
, (4)
where φα(x)
∆
=
∫
θ∈Θ p
α
θ (x)dξ(θ) normalizes the pseudo posterior distribution
and rn,α (θ, θ
∗) =
∑n
i=1 αi log
{
pθ∗i (xi)/pθi(xi)
}
, which is a generalization of
the definition from Bhattacharya et al. [3] to incorporate risk-adjusted weights,
(αi)i=1,··· ,n.
Under the DP paradigm for estimating risk, we formulate the α−weighted
log-pseudo likelihood,
fαθ (x) =
n∑
i=1
αi(x) log pθ(xi), (5)
that we use to estimate the pseudo posterior mechanism. The vector of weights,
α, is constructed to be inversely proportional to the local Lipschitz bound,
supθ∈Θ|fθ(x)−fθ(y)| for an observed x and all y that are withing a Hamming-1
distance of x (where f = log pθ) estimated from the unweighted posterior mech-
anism. Once we have computed the α using the unweighted posterior mechanism
and formed fαθ (x), we evaluate the local Lipschitz bound for each x ∈ Xn and
each y at a Hamming-1 distance from x as, supθ∈Θ|fα(x)θ (x)− fα(y)θ (y)| for all
y ∈ Xn.
The Hamming distance between databases that we use to estimate the local
Lipschitz bound, ∆x, is defined based on the number of data records in database
y ∈ Xn that differ from the corresponding records in a database, x.
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Definition 2. (Hamming distance) Given databases x = (x1, · · · , xn) and y =
(y1, · · · , yn), let δ(x,y) denote the Hamming distance between x and y:
δ(x,y) = #{i : xi 6= yi}. (6)
2.2. Main Results
Our task is to specify assumptions that guarantee our pseudo posterior mecha-
nism achieves an −DP guarantee; in particular, we extend Dimitrakakis et al.
[5] to show a direct relationship between the Lipschitz bound for the pseudo
likelihood and the resulting − DP guarantee where both are a function of the
record-indexed vector of weights, α specified by the data provider. We present
a collection of related results in this section with all of the associated proofs in
Appendix A.
2.2.1. Link the Global Lipschitz Bound to the Global DP Guarantee
In this section and corresponding sections in Appendix A, we use the explicit
notation α(x). We begin by extending the definition of DP from Dimitrakakis
et al. [5] to our α−weighted pseudo posterior mechanism.
Definition 3. (Differential Privacy)
sup
x,y∈Xn:δ(x,y)=1
sup
B∈βΘ
ξα(x)(B | x)
ξα(y)(B | y) ≤ e
,
which limits the change in the pseudo posterior distribution over all sets, B ∈ βΘ
(i.e. βΘ is the σ−algebra of measurable sets on Θ), from the inclusion of a single
record. Although the pseudo posterior distribution mass assigned to B depends
on x, the  guarantee is defined as the supremum over all x ∈ Xn and for all
y ∈ Xn : δ(x,y) = 1.
Our main assumption extends Dimitrakakis et al. [5] to bound the log-pseudo
likelihood ratio, uniformly, for all databases, y ∈ Xn that are at a Hamming−1
distance (i.e. δ(x,y) = 1) over all x ∈ Xn and θ ∈ Θ. The uniform bound defines
a maximum sensitivity in the log-pseudo likelihood from the inclusion of a record
(at a Hamming−1 distance from each database in the space of databases). Our
intuition that the magnitude of this sensitivity for the log-pseudo likelihood
ratio is directly tied to the resulting − DP guarantee of the pseudo posterior
is confirmed in two results below.
Assumption 1. (Lipschitz continuity)
Fix a θ ∈ Θ and define a vector-valued mapping α∗(·): Xn → [0, 1]n and con-
struct the Lipschitz function of θ over the space of databases,
`α
∗
(θ)
∆
= inf
{
w :
∣∣∣fα∗(x)θ (x)− fα∗(y)θ (y)∣∣∣ ≤ w,∀x,y ∈ Xn : δ(x,y) = 1} .
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Assumption 1 restricts Θ such that the Lipschitz function of θ is uniformly
bounded from above,
`α(θ) ≤ ∆α∗ ; θ ∈ Θ; α(z) ≤ α∗(z),∀z ∈ Xn,
where the last inequality is elementwise bounding of all potential mappingsα(z):
αi(z) ≤ α∗i (z) for each coordinate i = 1, . . . , n. We note that the subscripting
of ∆ with α∗ is a notational device that denotes a Lipschitz bound computed
using the log-pseudo likelihood, f
α∗(x)
θ (x) as contrasted with ∆ computed using
the unweighted posterior mechanism. We further note that our general result
simplifies to that of Dimitrakakis et al. [5] by specifying α∗ = 1 and therefore
`α(θ) ≤ ∆α ≤ ∆.
We refer to ∆α as “global” over the space of databases, x ∈ Xn and it
represents the sensitivity of the α−weighted pseudo likelihood of Equation (10)
that we use as our utility function. The Lipschitz function of θ and α, `α(θ), is
constructed using the pseudo log-likelihood, f
α(x)
θ (x) that incorporates record-
indexed weights, α(x), each of which is ≤ 1. Choosing an αi that strongly
downweights a highly sensitive record for an unweighted posterior mechanism
(with a high magnitude log-likelihood ratio for some θ ∈ Θ) will reduce the
sensitivity of that record under our pseudo posterior mechanism. We see in our
first two results that reducing the sensitivity of the log-likelihood ratio directly
improves (reduces) the −DP guarantee.
Our next result directly connects the (global) Lipschitz bound, ∆α, for the
log-pseudo likelihood of Assumption 1 to resulting DP guarantee,  = 2∆α, for
each draw of θ from the pseudo posterior distribution.
Theorem 1. ∀x,y ∈ Xn : δ(x,y) = 1, B ∈ βΘ (where βΘ is the σ−algebra of
measurable sets on Θ) under α(·) with ∆α > 0 satisfying Assumption 1:
sup
B∈βΘ
sup
x,y∈Xn:δ(x,y)=1
ξα(x)(B | x)
ξα(y)(B | y) ≤ exp(2∆α), (7)
i.e. the pseudo posterior ξα(z)(· | z) is 2∆α−DP.
This result directly connects the global Lipschitz bound to the global DP
guarantee and will allow us to control the DP guarantee, indirectly, by setting
the record-indexed weights, α, that determines the Lipschitz bound.
Our next result extends our DP guarantee from posterior draws of θ for
models that satisfy Assumption 1 to draws of synthetic data, ζ = (ζ1, . . . , ζm),
constructed from the model posterior predictive distribution, which is the focus
of our pseudo posterior mechanism.
Lemma 1. Define Pα(x)(ζ ∈ C | x) = ∫ P (ζ ∈ C | θ,x)dξα(x)(θ | x) as the
pseudo posterior predictive probability mass for ζ in set C ∈ An (the σ−algebra
of sets for Xn), constructed from our pseudo posterior model for θ that sat-
isfies DP with expenditure, . Let ζ = (ζ1, . . . , ζm) be m independent draws
from Pα(x)(ζ ∈ C | x). This defines a mechanism for ζ that satisfies DP with
expenditure  for any m ≤ n.
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The above results, together, convey that if the pseudo log-likelihood, fαθ (x),
is Lipschitz ∆α, our pseudo posterior mechanism provides a 2∆α−DP expen-
diture for each draw of a synthetic database. To satisfy Assumption 1 for any
likelihood, the procedure for implementing our pseudo posterior mechanism sets
weights, (αi)i=1,...,n, to be inversely proportional to the supremum of the like-
lihood values computed from the non-differentially private, unweighted mecha-
nism over θ ∈ Θ for each x1, . . . , xn for all possible observed x ∈ Xn. Evaluating
the ratio, pθ(x)pθ(y) for all databases, y : δ(x,y) = 1 for our observed x, we divide
the full data likelihood by a leave-one-out likelihood for each i ∈ (1, . . . , n), such
that the ratio simplifies to the individual likelihood values, pαiθ (xi). Therefore,
achieving the ∆α bound for the log-pseudo likelihood ratios reduces to bound-
ing the log-pseudo likelihood values for the individual data component contri-
butions. Our weighting scheme is constructed such that for any log-likelihood
contribution that is non-finite (violating Assumption 1), the associated weight
is set to 0, which removes the log-likelihood contribution for these records from
our pseudo posterior mechanism. We formalize the weighting scheme that char-
acterizes our pseudo posterior mechanism in the assumption, below.
Assumption 2. (Risk-based Weighting for Pseudo Posterior Mechanism)
Fix an n. Let m(·) be a monotonically decreasing scalar function m : [0,∞) →
[0, 1] such that m(0) = 1, and m(∞) = 0. For every x ∈ Xn choose a mapping
α(·) such that
αi = m
(
sup
θ∈Θ
|fθ (xi)|
)
, (8)
where fθ (xi) is computed from the unweighted, non-differentially private syn-
thesizer. Under this procedure for selecting risk-based weights, αi, i = 1, . . . , n,
if fθ (xi) is non-finite for any xi and value of θ ∈ Θ, αi is set to m(∞) = 0,
which removes the contribution of database record, i, from the pseudo likelihood
of Equation (3) used to formulate the pseudo posterior mechanism of Equa-
tion (4).
The mapping m(·) in Assumption 2 includes threshold (m(z) = 1{z<z∗}) as
well as smooth functions (m(z) = (z+1)−1), providing us the flexibility for how
to implement the weighting in practice. Since we remove the likelihood contri-
butions for all database records with non-finite log-likelihoods by setting their
associated weights in our pseudo posterior mechanism to m(∞) = 0, our mech-
anism is guaranteed to satisfy Assumption 1 and thus be globally differentially
private (i.e. a finite global budget  exists). This is a non-asymptotic result at
every n; however we want to estimate the global ∆α (and, therefore, ), rather
than simply knowing it exists.
We use this result to implement our α−weighted pseudo posterior mecha-
nism. Fix a database, x, and compute a record-indexed vector of log-likelihood
ratios, |fθ (xi) | and linearly transform them to |f˜θ,i| ∈ [0, 1] such that records
with lower values for |fθ,i|, that indicate lower identification risks, produce val-
ues of f˜θ,i near 0. We, next, set αi = c × (1 − f˜i) + g where c and g may be
used by the data provider to scale and shift the weights, respectively, restricted
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to αi ∈ [0, 1], ∀i ∈ (1, . . . , n). The choice of weights, in turn, determines the
Lipschitz bound, ∆α,x, for database, x and the local DP privacy guarantee of
2∆α,x. So the data provider indirectly controls the local privacy guarantee by
formulating the weights. We discuss an asymptotic method in Section 4 that
“discovers” a global Lipschitz bound and associated global  of an (, δ)− prob-
abilistic DP guarantee from a local result. We show that the δ, the probability
of deviating from − DP, contracts onto 0 for a sufficiently large sample size, n.
The following result allows us to simplify our estimation of ∆α by using the
leave-one-out method to estimate an alternative bound, ∆′α, where ∆α ≤ ∆′α.
Lemma 2. ∀x,y ∈ Xn : δ(x,y) = 1 and α(·) with ∆α > 0 satisfying Assump-
tion 1, denote the leave-one-out vector x−i = {x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . xn} and
construct the corresponding function of θ over the space of databases,
`αloo(θ)
∆
= inf
{
w :
∣∣∣fα(x)θ (x)− fα(x−i)θ (x−i)∣∣∣ ≤ w,∀x ∈ Xn, i ∈ 1, . . . , n}
= inf
{
w :
∣∣∣fα(xi)θ (xi)∣∣∣ ≤ w,∀xi ∈ x} . (9)
Then
∆α = sup
θ
{`α(θ)} ≤ sup
θ
{`αloo(θ)} = ∆′α.
Since we bound the supremum of `α(θ) from Assumption 1 from above by
the supremum of `αloo(θ), we may thus simplify our search for a bound for ∆α to
the leave-one-out neighborhood and look at the magnitude of
∣∣∣fα(xi)θ (xi)∣∣∣ rather
than search across the Hamming-1 neighborhood and compare the magnitude
of
∣∣∣fα(x)θ (x)− fα(y)θ (y)∣∣∣.
3. Computing a Local Lipschitz Bound
In this section, we describe the implementation algorithm to compute the pseudo
likelihood weights, α = (α1, . . . , αn) for a local database, x, from the unweighted
synthesizer and the subsequent computation of the local Lipschitz bound, ∆α,x,
associated with the pseudo posterior mechanism. In Section 3.1, we lay out
the connection between the scalar-weighted pseudo posterior mechanism and
the EM, with a discussion of the implications on the data utility of locally
differentially private synthetic data generated under the two mechanisms.
1. Compute weights α
(a) Let |fθs,i| denote the absolute value of the log-likelihood computed
from the unweighted pseudo posterior synthesizer for database record,
i ∈ (1, . . . , n) and MCMC draw, s ∈ (1, . . . , S) of θ.
(b) Compute the S × n matrix of by-record (absolute value of) log-
likelihoods, L = {|fθs,i|}i=1,...,n, s=1,...,S .
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(c) Compute the maximum over each S × 1 column of L to produce
the n× 1 (database record-indexed) vector, f = (f1, . . . , fn). We use
a linear transformation of each fi to f˜i ∈ [0, 1] where values of f˜i
closer to 1 indicates relatively higher identification disclosure risk:
f˜i =
fi−minj fj
maxj fj−minj fj .
(d) We formulate by-record weights, α = (α1, · · · , αn),
αi = c× (1− f˜i) + g, (10)
where c and g denote a scaling and a shift parameters, respectively, of
the αi used to tune the risk-utility trade-off. If we set scaling tuning
parameter, c = 1 and shift tuning parameter, g = 0, then each αi is
simply (1 − f˜i) such that the pseudo likelihood weights are solely a
function of the record-indexed log likelihoods. As discussed in Hu and
Savitsky [8], decreasing c < 1 will compress the distribution of the
(αi) while setting g < 0 will shift downward the distribution of the
weights such that more weights will be close to 0. We use truncation
to ensure each αi ∈ [0, 1]. These α satisfy Assumption 2.
We will show in Section 5 the effects of different configurations of
c and g on the risk and utility profiles of the differentially private
synthetic dataset for the CE sample, generated under our proposed
α−weighted pseudo posterior mechanism.
2. Compute Lipschitz bound, ∆α,x
(a) Use α = (α1, . . . , αn) to construct the pseudo likelihood of Equa-
tion (3) from which the pseudo posterior of Equation (4) is estimated.
Draw (θs)s=1,...S from the α−weighted pseudo posterior distribution.
(b) As earlier, compute the S× n matrix of log-pseudo likelihood values,
Lα =
{
|fαθs,i|
}
i=1,...,n, s=1,...,S
(c) Compute ∆α,x = maxs,i|fαθs,i|.
3. Draw synthetic data, ζ`, from the pseudo posterior distribution
(a) Using the (θs)s=1,...S drawn from the α−weighted pseudo poste-
rior distribution estimated in the earlier step, randomly sample ` =
1, . . . , (m = 20) parameter values and draw synthetic data value,
ζ`,i
ind∼ pθ`(·) for parameter draw ` ∈ (1, . . . ,m) and database record
i ∈ (1, . . . , n). This step accomplishes a draw from the pseudo poste-
rior predictive distribution.
(b) Release the synthetic data, ζ = (ζ1, · · · , ζm), in place of the closely-
held real data, x.
Our pseudo posterior mechanism indirectly sets the local DP guarantee,
2∆α,x through the computation and subsequent scaling and shifting of the like-
lihood weights, α.
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3.1. Exponential Mechanism Reduces to Scalar Weighting
Wasserman and Zhou [19], Zhang et al. [20], Snoke and Slavkovic [16] use the
EM to generate synthetic data with privacy guarantees from a non-private mech-
anism. Suppose we start with a non-private mechanism, such as an unweighted
synthesizer in Equation (11),
ξ (θ | x, γ) ∝
[
n∏
i=1
p (xi | θ)
]
ξ (θ | γ) . (11)
Under our set-up that the log-likelihood function is the utility function, i.e.
u(x, θ) = log (
∏n
i=1 p (xi | θ)), the EM generates private samples from
θˆ ∝ exp
(
 log (
∏n
i=1 p (xi | θ))
2∆
)
ξ (θ | γ) , (12)
where the prior, ξ(θ | γ), is chosen as the “base” distribution as in Zhang et al.
[20] specified by McSherry and Talwar [13] that ensures the EM produces a
proper density function. Furthermore,
exp
(
 log (
∏n
i=1 p (xi | θ))
2∆
)
ξ (θ | γ) = exp(log(
n∏
i=1
p (xi | θ)) 2∆ )ξ (θ | γ)
=
(
n∏
i=1
p (xi | θ)

2∆
)
ξ (θ | γ) , (13)
which means that the EM is equivalent to a risk-adjusted, scalar-weighted
pseudo posterior synthesizer with scalar weight 2∆ , where αi =

2∆ , ∀i ∈
(1, . . . , n). Wang et al. [18] derived this same scalar-weighted result in their im-
plementation of a gradient descent algorithm to sample the EM under a pseudo
log-likelihood utility.
Using a scalar weight, αi =

2∆ , ∀i ∈ (1, . . . , n), shown in Equation (13), we
expect a resulting lower utility for synthetic data draws under this mechanism
than we do under our α−weighted pseudo posterior shown in Equation (2).
The α−weighted pseudo posterior is more surgical and concentrates the down-
weighting to higher risk records, whereas the EM must downweight all records
the same amount. Downweighting all records the same amount will be conserva-
tive because the scalar weight is based on the worst case sensitivity, ∆, over the
entire database of records and the parameter space, which is required to achieve
a local DP privacy guarantee, and not tuned to the risk (f˜i) of each record.
The re-casting of the EM as a scalar-weighted pseudo likelihood under a
log-likelihood utility also provides insight into why our α− pseudo posterior
mechanism sets the − DP guarantee indirectly through specification of the
vector of weights, α = (α1, . . . , αn), that determines ∆α, which in turn, deter-
mines  = 2∆α. Since the commonly-used EM utilizes a single, scalar weight
for all records, it is straightforward to directly set , but at a tremendous loss
of efficiency in terms of risk-utility trade-off as compared to the α− pseudo
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posterior mechanism. The latter specifies a unique level of privacy protection to
each record based on its absolute value of log-likelihood such that the overall
 is an outcome. So our mechanism achieves a higher utility for an equivalent
supremum bound / guarantee, .
We illustrate in Section 5 the reduction in utility of the local differentially
private synthetic dataset generated under the EM, compared to that generated
under our proposed α−weighted pseudo posterior mechanism, at an equivalent
privacy guarantee for both mechanisms.
4. Turning A Local Bound into A Global Bound
In this section we proceed to demonstrate that a local Lipschitz bound or sensi-
tivity, ∆α,x, computed on observed database, x, contracts on or becomes arbri-
trarily close to ∆α, the global Lipschitz bound or supremum over the space of
databases, Xn for sample size, n, sufficiently large.
4.1. Asymptotic Convergence of Local Lipschitz to Global Lipschitz
Although our DP result is non-asymptotic for every n, in the sense that we
have earlier shown that a finite global ∆α is guaranteed to exist under our α−
weighted pseudo posterior mechanism, we nevertheless do not know its value.
We employ asymptotics to learn the global Lipschitz bound, ∆α, to any degree
of desired precision. We develop a contraction result for any α−weighted pseudo
distribution to demonstrate under a set of conditions that convergence of the
pseudo posterior distribution leads to asymptotic convergence of the local Lips-
chitz bound, ∆α,x, to the global bound, ∆α in Pθ0−probability for n sufficiently
large.
Our asymptotic contraction of the local Lipschitz bound onto the global Lip-
schitz bound (that has a direct functional relationshp to ) does not provide
a global − DP guarantee because there is the possibility of leakage of private
information, δ, at any fixed sample size such that our computed  on a local
database may be exceeded. Therefore, we employ our asymptotic result on the
contraction of Lipschitz bounds to claim an (, δ)− probabilitistic DP guarantee
where δ represents a probability that there are some databases in the space of
databases for which  is exceeded. Under our asymptotic contraction of local
Lipschitz bounds to the global bound, we achieve that δ contracts onto 0.
We formally introduce a definition for probabilistic differential privacy (pDP)
that adapts the formulation of Machanavajjhala et al. [11] to our α− weighted
pseudo posterior mechanism.
Definition 4. (Probabilistic Differential Privacy) Let  > 0 and 0 < δ < 1. We
say that our pseudo posterior mechanism is (, δ)-probabilistically differentially
private (pDP) if ∀x ∈ Xn,
Pr
(
sup
B∈βΘ
ξα(x)(B | x) ∈ Disc(x, )
)
≤ δ,
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where Disc(x, ) denotes the disclosure set,
{x ∈ Xn : supB∈βΘ log
(
ξα(x)(B|x)
ξα(y)(B|y)
)
> , ∀y : δ(x,y) = 1}, which denotes the
subspace of Xn that exceeds an -DP guarantee.
This definition constructs a probability for the event that there are any
databases in the space of databases for which our pseudo posterior mechanism
exceeds  under the Hamming-1 distance. We recall that our vector weights,
α = (α1, . . . , αn) determine ∆α, which indirectly sets  ≤ 2∆α. Therefore our
asymptotic result on the contraction of the local to global Lipschitz bound, pre-
sented in the sequel, reveals that δ, which represents the (maximum) probability
that − DP is exceeded, goes to 0 in Pθ0− probability.
We conduct a simulation study that demonstrates the contraction of the
distribution for the local ∆α,x for a relatively moderate sample sizes and suggest
a procedure for selecting a global  that would result in a very small-to-negligible
δ.
4.2. Preliminaries
We account for the dependence of αi on x, which generalizes Bhattacharya et al.
[3], in assessing the frequentist properties of our Bayesian estimator since under
frequentist consistency, the x are random with respect to Pθ (for fixed θ), so
taking probabilities and expectations with respect to Pθ requires us to address
the dependence of αi on x to construct the contraction rate for correctness and
thoroughness. We drop the notation denoting the explicit dependence of αi(x)
for most of the paper and just use αi for readability when the context is clear.
Since our pseudo posterior formulation induces misspecification, we allow the
true generating parameters, θ0, to lie outside the parameter space, Θ. We will
show in the sequel that our model contracts on θ∗ ∈ Θ in Pθ0−probability, where
θ∗ is the point that minimizes the Kullback-Liebler (KL) divergence from Pθ0 ;
that is,
θ∗ := arg min
θ∈Θ
D (pθ, pθ0) , (14)
where D(p, q) =
∫
p log(p/q)dµ for dominating measure, µ.
Our asymptotic result on the contraction in Pθ0−probability relies on bound-
ing the α−Re´nyi divergence measure,
D
(n)
θ0,α
(θ, θ∗) =
n∑
i=1
Dθ0,α,i (θ, θ
∗) =
n∑
i=1
1
αi − 1 log {Aθ0,α,i (θ, θ
∗)} , (15)
where Aθ0,α,i (θ, θ
∗) =
∫ ( pθi
pθ∗
i
)αi
pθ0,idµi under dominating measure µi is de-
fined as theα−affinity for observation, xi, such thatA(n)θ0,α (θ, θ∗) =
∏n
i=1Aθ0,α,i (θ, θ
∗),
the α−affinity for the product measure space.
The posterior probability of the α−Re´nyi distance between θ ∈ Θ and the
point θ∗ limits to 0 at a rate that is a function of n for any weighting scheme,
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α(x), where the construction of α depends on the observed data, x, as does
ours. We require the following two conditions to achieve contraction of the local
∆α,x to the global ∆α:
Assumption 3. (Prior mass covering truth) We construct a KL neighborhood
of θ∗ with radius, η,with,
Bn (θ
∗, η; θ0) =
{
θ ∈ Θ :
n∑
i=1
∫
pθ0,i log
(
pθ∗i /pθi
)
dµi ≤ nη2,
n∑
i=1
∫
pθ0,i log
2
(
pθ∗i /pθi
)
dµi ≤ nη2
}
. (16)
Restrict the prior, ξ, to place positive probability on this KL neighborhood,
ξ (Bn (θ
∗, η; θ0)) ≥ e−nτ2n . (17)
Assumption 4. (Control size of α) Let An :=
{
i : αi < 1
−; i ∈ 1, . . . , n} and
nA := |An|, where |An| denotes the number of elements in An. Let Qn :={
i : αi = α
(n) ≥ 1−; i ∈ 1, . . . , n
}
for some constant α(n) and nQ := |Qn|.
lim sup
n
|An| = lim sup
n
nA = O
(
n
1
2
)
, with Pθ0−probability 1,
lim sup
n
(1− α(n)) = O
(
n
− 12
Q
)
, with Pθ0−probability 1,
such that for constants C1, C3 > 0 and n sufficiently large,
sup
n
|An| ≤ C1n 12 ,
sup
n
(1− α(n)) ≤ C3τnn−
1
2
Q .
These two assumptions are required for consistency of our α−pseudo pos-
terior mechanism at θ∗. The first assumption requires the prior to place some
mass on a KL ball near θ∗ as defined in Equation (14). The second assumption
outlines a dyadic subgrouping of data records, where An contains those records
whose likelihood contributions are downweighted to lessen the estimated identi-
fication disclosure risk (and improve privacy) for those records in the resulting
synthetic data. The second subset of records, Qn, contains those records that are
minimally downweighted due to nearly zero values for identification disclosure
risks. Since αi < 1, ∀i ∈ (1, . . . , n), the constant value, α(n), for all units in Qn
approaches 1 from the left. We show that the consistency result to θ∗ for the
synthesizer is dominated by the likelihood weighting for records in the down-
weighted set, An. Assumption 4 restricts the number of downweighted records
(where αi < 1
−) to grow at a slower rate than the sample size, n, such that the
downweighting becomes relatively more sparse. Our experience demonstrates
that when weights are constructed based on disclosure risks, downweighting is
confined to isolated records, which are sparse.
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Theorem 2. (Contraction of the α−pseudo posterior distribution).
Let α = (α1 ∈ [0, 1], . . . , αn ∈ [0, 1]). Define αm := max
i∈An
αi ∈ [0, 1] and αl :=
min
i∈An
αi ∈ [0, 1]. Let D(nA)θ0,α (θ, θ∗) =
∑
i∈An Dθ0,α,i and D
(nQ)
θ0,1−
(θ, θ∗) =
∑
i∈Qn Dθ0,1−,i.
Let θ∗ be as defined in Equation (14). Assume that τn satisfies nτ2n ≥ 2 and sup-
pose Assumptions 3 and 4 hold. Let C∗1 =
√
2 + C21 + C
2
3 ≥
√
2. Then for any
D ≥ 2 and t > 0,
ξα
(
1
n
[
(1− αm)D(nA)θ0,α (θ, θ∗) + (1− α(n))D
(nQ)
θ0,1−
(θ, θ∗)
]
≥ (D + 3t)τ2n
∣∣x) ≤ e−tnτ2n ,
(18)
hold with Pθ0−probability at least 1−
[
(α2l + 2)(C
∗
1 )
2/α2m × 2/
{
(D + t− 1)2nτ2n
}]
.
Since (1 − α(n)) = O(n−1/2Q ), while nA = O(n1/2), the first term domi-
nates with increasing n, so that the (1 − αm)−1 is the dominating penalty on
the τn contraction rate of the α−pseudo posterior onto θ∗. Even though the
downweighting becomes relatively more sparse due to Assumption 4, it is the
maximum value of αi for i ∈ An on the set of downweighted records that pe-
nalizes the rate. We observe that the rate of contraction is injured by factor,
(1− αm)−1. Since αi ≤ 1−, ∀i ∈ An, our result generalizes Bhattacharya et al.
[3] to allow a tempering of a portion of the posterior distribution and there is
a penalty to be paid in terms of contraction rate for the tempering. Since we
induce the misspecification through the weights, α, the distance of the point
of contraction, θ∗ from the true generating parameters, θ0, and the contrac-
tion rate on this point are both impacted by the induced misspecification. The
requirement for increasing sparsity in the number of downweighted record like-
lihood contributions, however, ensures that θ∗ will be relatively close to θ0 that
produces a high utility for our (pseudo posterior) estimator.
If we plug in for τn, we see that our contraction of Θ to θ
∗ occurs at a rate
that is of O(n−1/2).
4.3. Contraction of Local Lipschitz bound onto Global bound
Asymptotically, then, the space θ ∈ Θ collapses onto θ∗ for n sufficiently large
and the space of databases, x ∈ Xn becomes x ∼ Pθ∗ , where the synthesized x
derives from a “corrupted” or misspecified data generating process designed to
encode privacy protection. Since the contraction of the pseudo posterior distri-
bution induces the collapsing of the parameter space to a point and the space
of databases to a single distribution (conditioned on θ∗) for large n, this re-
sult guarantees that the local Lipschitz bound, ∆α,x contracts on to the global
bound ∆α for n sufficiently large. Heuristically, since the space of distributions
collapses to a single distribution that distribution is well described by a single
database, x, for sufficiently large n. That means as one draws more databases,
x
′ ∈ Xn, that the maximum absolute value of the log-likelihood will be arbi-
trarily close to that for x for n sufficiently large. Assumption 2 ensures a formal
privacy guarantee since ∆α < ∞, by construction, and the asymptotic result
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guarantees that the local ∆α,x will get arbitrarily close to the global ∆α where
 = 2∆α. For n sufficiently large, then, ∆α,x = ∆α becomes independent of
x ∈ Xn, where we recall that  = 2∆α. This contraction of the local Lipschitz
bound onto a global value that determines the privacy guarantee, , indicates
that δ of our (, δ)− pDP guarantee in Equation 14 contracts onto 0 at O(n−1/2)
rate at which ∆α,x contracts onto ∆α.
To make intuitive the rate of contraction of δ to 0 at O(n−1/2) we conduct
a Monte Carlo simulation study in the next section to develop a distribution
of local Lipschitz bounds from which we compute the local Lipschitz, ∆α,x,
each at an increasing sequence of sample sizes, n. We introduce a truncation of
each weight, αi; if its absolute log likelihood contribution, αi × fi > M , we set
final weight, α∗i = 0. Likelihood threshold, M , implements a stronger version
of our Assumption 2 and speeds contraction of the local Lipschitz bounds onto
M . We reveal that the maxima of these local Lipschitz distributions contracts
together onto a single global value while each distribution collapses together,
demonstrating the local-to-global contraction as n increases.
4.4. Simulation Study
We next utilize a Monte Carlo simulation study by fixing a sample size, n, and
repeatedly generating a count data sample from a Poisson generating model.
We proceed to compute the local Lipschitz bound for each sample database for
the α− weighted pseudo posterior mechanism and also the unweighted posterior
synthesizer to provide a comparison. This procedure gives us a distribution of the
local Lipchitz bounds across databases of size n. We repeat this process for an
increasing sequence of sample sizes, n = 100 ∗ 4(0,1,2,3) = (100, 400, 1600, 6400).
In addition to computing the local Lipschitz bounds at each n for the α−
weighted pseudo posterior mechanism, we introduce an extension to our pseudo
posterior mechanism that truncates the weight, αi, for each likelihood contri-
bution in the following procedure:
1. Compute weights, α, for local database, x, using the procedure of Sec-
tion 3. We first compute fi (the maximum of absolute log-likelihood val-
ues for record, i, over the sampled values of θs) for each database record,
i ∈ (1, . . . , n), from the unweighted posterior mechanism. Then using the
linear transform, αi = 1− f˜i, where f˜i = fi−minj fjmaxj fj−minj fj .
2. We add a step to truncate the weight for any record whose weighted likeli-
hood value is greater than some threshold, M , to 0, completely removing
the likelihood contribution for record i. We accomplish this truncation by
forming a weighted absolute log-likelihood for each record, i, as αi × fi.
If αi × fi > M , we set final weight, α∗i = 0; otherwise we leave α∗i = αi
unchanged.
The use of a threshold, M , to truncate weights is a stricter implementation from
our weight-setting procedure of Assumption 2. We recall that this assumption
guarantees the existence of a global Lipschitz because for every database it sets
imsart-ejs ver. 2020/08/06 file: ppmdp_EJS_082120.tex date: September 4, 2020
Savitsky, Williams, Hu/Bayesian Pseudo Posterior under Differential Privacy 18
the weight for a record with a non-finite absolute log likelihood to 0. In this
stricter implementation, we set α∗i = 0 if its weighted absolute log likelihood
is > M , where we choose M based on oracle information based on experience
with databases of similar types.
Using the means model for Poisson distributed data, y ∼ Pois(µ) (with
µ = 100) our simulation procedure is, as follows
1. For sample size, n ∈ {100, 400, 1600, 6400}, repeat the following Monte
Carlo procedure to generate a distribution of local Lipschitz bounds:
2. For r = 1, . . . , 400:
• Generate yr ∼ Pois(µ), each of size n.
• Compute the local Lipschitz bound, ∆α,y, for the unweighted,α−weighted,
and M− truncation-weighted pseudo posterior mechanisms.
• Construct the distribution of ∆α,yr and note the maximum of the
distribution and difference between the maximum and minimum val-
ues of the distribution of the local Lipschitz bounds at each sample
size, n.
3. Assess contraction of the maxr ∆α,yr to a single (global) value and whether
the minimum and maximum values collapse together.
Figure 1 compares the distributions across the R = 400 replications for the
unweighted, α− weighted and M− truncated weighted mechanisms, from left-
to-right. At any sample size, the α−weighted pseudo posterior mechanism la-
beled “Weighted”, produces a marked decrease in local maximum Lipschitz
compared to the unweighted (labeled “Unweighted”).
To assess the contraction of the maximum point in the distribution of local
Lipschitz bounds to the global Lipschitz bound, we repeat the simulation above
using sample sizes n = (100, 400, 1600, 6400). Figure 1 demonstrates that the
distribution of local Lipschitz bounds for the unweighted likelihood increases (or
drifts) with larger sample sizes. The α−weighted log-pseudo likelihood shows
a pronounced decrease in drift, though even at sample size, 6400, there is still
a small, though decreasing drift of the maximum Lipschitz. By contrast, the
weighted−M , where we set M = 3.5, demonstrates rapid contraction of both
the minimum and maximum local Lipschitz values onto M . This is still a prob-
abilistic formal privacy result because the local Lipschitz values are not strictly
bounded below M due to sampling variability of θ. So we rely on the contraction
of θ to make M a global guarantee. While both the weighted and weighted−M
local Lipschitz bounds contract at O(n−1/2), the multiplicative constant of the
contraction rate is much smaller for weighted−M because of the truncation to
an asymptotic global Lipschitz of M defined by the owner of the closely-held
data.
Figure 2 presents the distributions for the averages of the mean parameter,
µ, over the R = 400 Monte Carlo iterations. We see there is some utility loss
relative to unweighted and weighted under use of weighted−M , though the
resulting utility is still relatively robust.
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Fig 1. Distribution of the maximum observed Lipschitz bound ∆y for each of sample sizes
(100, 400, 1600, 6400) from R = 400 realizations of pseudo posterior samples of (left to right)
unweighted, weighted, weighted−M (M− truncated weights).
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Fig 2. Distributions of the average of mean parameter µ for each of sample size
(100, 400, 1600, 6400) from R = 400 realizations of pseudo posterior samples of (left to right)
unweighted, weighted, weighted−M (M− truncated weights).
4.5. Recommendation for Setting a Global  from a weighted−M
Lipschitz
Although we have demonstrated an O(n−1/2) contraction rate of δ (the prob-
ability of exceeding − global DP), in theory, and have further illustrated this
convergence in our above simulation study, it is difficult in practice to discover
at what sample size under a specific synthesizer that one may declare the local
Lipschitz to be global. For typically used sample sizes > 1000 we suggest to
take the weighted−M Lipschitz and employ a multiplicative “factor of safety”,
c ∈ (1, 1.05), to develop an upper, global bound that, in turn, determines 
because the contraction is extremely rapid. If the sample size is < 1000, we
recommend to set multiplicative c
′ ∈ (1.05, 1.10).
One may yet prefer a formal − global DP guarantee in lieu of our achieved
(, δ)− pDP, where δ contracts onto 0. In Appendix C we offer an alternative to
the asymptotic contraction of a local Lipschitz bound for guaranteeing a global
Lipschitz bound by, instead, censoring the α− weighted pseudo likelihood. We
pick a censoring threshold for the α− weighted pseudo likelihood that restricts
the global Lipschitz to at or below this level for sampling parameters, θ, and
drawing the synthetic data. The censoring threshold is chosen based on oracle
information derived from historical experience with the specific class of data
that are the focus for embedding a formal privacy guarantee.
5. Application to the CE Sample
We introduce the CE sample of consumer units (CU) or households in Section
5.1, where our goal is to synthesize a highly-skewed continuous variable, family
income, under a local DP guarantee provided by our α−weighted pseudo poste-
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rior mechanism. In Section 5.2, we present risk and utility profiles of synthetic
data drawn from our α−weighted pseudo posterior mechanism, along with com-
parisons to the EM, the risked-weighted synthesizer of Hu and Savitsky [8] and
the unweighted posterior mechanism. Section 5.3 presents privacy and utility re-
sults with different scaling and shifting, (c, g), configurations for vector weights
in Equation (10) to sketch out a risk-utility curve for our α−weighted pseudo
posterior mechanism that we compare to that of the EM. A risk-utility curve
provides the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) options for selecting a risk-utility
setting that matches their policy objectives.
5.1. The CE Sample and Unweighted Synthesizer
Our application of the α−weighted pseudo posterior mechanism focuses on pro-
viding privacy protection for a family income variable published by the CE.
The CE is administered by the BLS with the purpose of providing income and
expenditure patterns indexed by geographic domains to support policy-making
by State and Federal governments. The description of the CE sample included
here closely follows that in Hu and Savitsky [8]. The CE contain data on expen-
ditures, income, and tax statistics about CUs across the U.S. The CE public-use
microdata (PUMD)1 is publicly available record-level data, published by the CE.
The CE PUMD has undergone masking procedures to provide privacy protec-
tion of survey respondents. Notably, the family income variable has undergone
top-coding, a popular Statistical Disclosure Limitation (SDL) procedure that
may result in reduced utility and insufficient privacy protection [2, 8].
The CE sample in our application contains n = 6208 CUs, coming from the
2017 1st quarter CE Interview Survey. It includes the family income variable,
which is highly right-skewed and deemed sensitive; see Figure 3 for its density
plot. The CE sample also contains 10 categorical variables, listed in Table 1.
These categorical variables are deemed insensitive and used as predictors in
building a flexible synthesizer for the synthesis of the sensitive family income
variable.
1For for information about CE PUMD, visit https://www.bls.gov/cex/pumd.htm.
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Fig 3. Density plot of Family Income in the CE sample.
Table 1
Variables used in the CE sample. Data taken from the 2017 Q1 Consumer Expenditure
Surveys.
Variable Description
Gender Gender of the reference person; 2 categories
Age Age of the reference person; 5 categories
Education Level Education level of the reference person; 8 categories
Region Region of the CU; 4 categories
Urban Urban status of the CU; 2 categories
Marital Status Marital status of the reference person; 5 categories
Urban Type Urban area type of the CU; 3 categories
CBSA 2010 core-based statistical area (CBSA) status; 3 categories
Family Size Size of the CU; 11 categories
Earner Earner status of the reference person; 2 categories
Family Income Imputed and reported income before tax of the CU;
approximate range: (-7K, 1,800K)
To generate partially synthetic datasets for the CE sample with synthetic
family income, we use an unweighted, non-private synthesizer: a flexible, para-
metric finite mixture synthesizer. This finite mixture synthesizer has been shown
to produce synthetic data characterized by a high utility, but also with an un-
acceptable level of disclosure risk in previous work [8]. We leave the details of
the synthesizer in the Appendix B for brevity and direct interested readers to
the aforementioned work for further information.
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5.2. Risk and Utility Comparisons
To generate synthetic data and compare results, we apply four synthesizers: 1)
the unweighted, non- (locally) private synthesizer, labeled “Unweighted”; 2) the
locally private synthesizer under the α−weighted pseudo posterior mechanism,
labeled “DPweighted”, with configuration (c, g) = (0.7, 0.0); 3) the locally pri-
vate synthesizer under the EM, labeled “EMweighted”, which is designed to
privacy target, , achieved by “DPweighted”; 4) and the weighted, though non-
(locally) private pseudo posterior synthesizer proposed by Hu and Savitsky [8],
labeled “Countweighted”, that utilizes their method for measuring the by-record
disclosure risk (based on an assumption about the behavior of an intruder). The
labels are used throughout the remainder of this paper when presenting various
risk and utility results.
We first look at the risk profiles of the four synthesizers. Figure 4 plots the
distributions of the Lipschitz bounds, ∆xi ’s, for each of the four synthesizers
computed by taking the maximum of the S log-likelihood ratios for each record,
i = 1, . . . , (n = 6208) over the S draws of θ from it’s posterior distribution.
The maximum value of the (∆xi) over all of the records is denoted as ∆x, the
Lipschitz bound for the mechanism.
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Fig 4. Violin plots of the distribution of the Lipschitz bounds, ∆x’s, for synthetic data gen-
erated the four synthesizers. The corresponding maximum ∆x values are: ∆Unweighted =
78.7,∆α,DPweighted = 10.1,∆EMweighted = 10.2,∆αc,Countweighted = 11.17.
The Unweighted, non-private synthesizer clearly has the highest maximum
∆x with ∆Unweighted = 78.7. The other non-private, Countweighted synthesizer
achieves a much lower maximum ∆x with ∆αc,Countweighted = 11.17. The large
reduction in the Countweighted synthesizer owes to the positive correlation be-
tween by-record weights, ∝ 1/αc, where each is computed as the probability
that the value for each target record is relatively isolated from that of other
records used in the Countweighted synthesizer, on the one hand, with the by-
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record log-pseudo likelihood ratio bounds used for the DPweighted mechanism,
on the other hand. The two locally private synthesizers both achieve even lower
maximum ∆x: ∆α,DPweighted = 10.1,∆EMweighted = 10.2, indicating the best
risk profiles. The EMweighted mechanism was estimated by setting the scalar
with a target  = 2∆α,x, the local privacy guarantee (expenditure) achieved
by our DPweighted mechanism with Lipschitz ∆α,x. Our intent is to compare
the utility performances between the two private mechanisms (DPweighted and
EMweighted) where each achieves an equivalent privacy guarantee. It bears men-
tion that while the DPweighted under the pseudo posterior mechanism and the
EMweighted under the EM achieve similar maximum local Lipschitz bounds,
which governs the local DP guarantee, the EM tends to produce notably lower
risk for most records than the DPweighted mechanism, evident in the flattened
shape of the violin plot. The EM sets the scalar weight based on the risk of the
worst case records because the same level of downweighting must be applied to
all records in contrast with the by-record weighting under of our α−weighted
pseudo posterior mechanism.
Figure 5 and Figure 6 show a collection of violin plots of the distribution
(obtained from re-sampling) for each of the mean and the 90th quantile statis-
tics, respectively, estimated on the synthetic data generated under each of our
synthesizers and also on the closely-held confidential (real) data for compari-
son, labeled “Data”. These figures allow us to compare the utility performances
across our synthesizers by the examination of how well the real data distribu-
tion for each statistic is reproduced by the synthetic dataset for each of our
synthesizers. For the synthesizers, a set of m = 20 synthetic datasets were gen-
erated and the distribution for each statistic was estimated on each dataset
(under re-sampling). The resulting barycenter of the individual distributions in
the Wasserstein space of measures was computed by averaging the quantiles
over the M datasets [17]. Our privacy guarantees apply to each synthetic draw
from our mechanism, so the total privacy expenditure is that for each dataset
shown in Figure 4 multiplied by m. We compute utilities over m = 20 synthetic
datasets for thoroughness, though the distribution of each statistic for a single
synthetic dataset is very similar.
The DPweighted synthesizer under the pseudo posterior mechanism out-
performs the EMweighted and Countweighted mechanisms in utility preserva-
tion. First, especially evident in Figure 6, DPweighted (the α−weighted pseudo
posterior mechanism) provides better estimates than EMweighted (the scalar-
weighted EM). The notably deteriorated utility preservation of the EM derives
from the setting that scalar weight applied to all records based on the high-
est risk records as earlier discussed. Since both mechanisms achieve the same
maximum Lipschitz bound ∆x, which governs the local DP guarantee, these
results indicate that the EM has to compromise a large amount of the utility
to achieve a similar local DP guarantee compared to the α−weighted pseudo
posterior mechanism.
Second, while the non-private Unweighted synthesizer and the locally private
DPweighted synthesizer provide equally good estimates for both the mean and
the 90th quantile, the much greater Lipschitz bound of the Unweighted syn-
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Fig 5. Violin plots of the mean estimation of the confidential CE sample and the four syn-
thesizers.
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Fig 6. Violin plots of the 90th quantile estimation of the confidential CE sample and the four
synthesizers.
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thesizer shown in Figure 4 indicates a much worse balance for the utility-risk
trade-off as compared to DPweighted. The third minor point is that the Coun-
tweighted synthesizer, albeit non-locally private, achieves only a slightly higher
maximum Lipschitz bound compared to our private DPweighted synthesizer;
however, its utility preservation is worse, especially evident in Figure 6 for the
90th quantile estimation.
In summary, our private DPweighted mechanism outperforms the other three
synthesizers to achieve a highly satisfactory risk-utility trade-off balance. We
next explore different scaling and shift configurations of (c, g) to sketch out the
risk-utility curves for DPweighted and EMweighted.
5.3. Mapping DP Risk and Utility Curves
We conclude by applying a scaling parameter, c, and a shift parameter, g, to the
distribution of weights, α, used in our α−weighted pseudo posterior mechanism
in order to enumerate the risk-utility settings for the purpose of allowing the BLS
(or, more generally, the owner of the closely-held private database) to discover
the setting configuration that best represents their policy goal. We compare the
risk-utility mapping produced by the α−weighted pseudo posterior mechanism
to that of the EM, which we recall reduces to a scalar-weighted pseudo posterior
under use of the log-likelihood as the utility measure. As discussed in Hu and
Savitsky [8], applying a scaling constant, c < 1, will induce a compression in the
distribution of the weights while apply a scaling g < 0 will induce a downward
shift in the distribution of the record-indexed weights. We apply the scaling and
shifting in a manner that uses truncation to ensure each of the resulting weights
are restricted to lie in [0, 1].
Each violin plot in Figure 7 presents a distribution of the 90th quantile for
a synthetic dataset generated under a particular (scale c, shift g) configuration.
The sequence of plots from left-to-right are ordered from less scaling and shift-
ing (with a relatively higher privacy expenditure) to more scaling and shifting
(with a relatively lower privacy expenditure). The specific sensitivity values,
∆α,x, associated with each configuration are shown in Table 2, where we recall
that the associated local privacy expenditure is  = 2∆α,x. Table 2 demon-
strates a nearly 80% reduction in the local DP expenditure over the range of
configurations (though all are much less than the non-locally private, unweighted
synthesizer). Figure 7 demonstrates a much flatter or reduced deterioration of
utility for DPweighted, the α−weighted pseudo posterior mechanism as com-
pared to EMweighted. Such is not surprising due to the greater flexibility of
DPweighted to concentrate downweighting to high risk records versus the ap-
plication of a scalar weight based on the highest risk record to all records under
EMweighted.
6. Conclusion
This paper adapts the α−weighted pseudo posterior synthesizer converts any
non-private posterior synthesizer to a formally private mechanism. Our pseudo
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Fig 7. Violin plots of the 90th quantile estimation of: 1) the confidential CE sample; 2) the un-
weighted, non-private synthesizer; and overlapping violin plots of the 90th quantile estimation
of the synthesizer under the pseudo posterior mechanism compared to the synthesizer under
the EM with equivalent ∆x values, for the following (c, g) configurations: 3) (c, g) = (0.7, 0.0);
4) (c, g) = (0.6, 0.0); 5) (c, g) = (0.6,−0.1); 6) (c, g) = (0.5, 0.0); 7) (c, g) = (0.5,−0.1); 8)
(c, g) = (0.5,−0.3).
Table 2
Table of values of the Lipchitz bound ∆α,x, of the synthesizer under the α−weighted pseudo
posterior mechanism, for a series of (c, g) configurations. ∆Unweighted = 78.7.
(c, g) ∆α,x value
(0.7, 0.0) 10.10
(0.6, 0.0) 8.16
(0.6, -0.1) 7.30
(0.5, 0.0) 6.09
(0.5, -0.1) 5.71
(0.5, -0.3) 2.25
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posterior mechanism provides a much higher utility than the EM for equiv-
alent risk due to a surgical downweighting of high risk records (as opposed
to the scalar downweighting imposed by the EM). The construction for the
α−weighted pseudo posterior mechanism utilizes the log-pseudo likelihood to
develop the Lipschitz bound. We provide an asymptotic result on the contraction
of a local Lipschitz to a global bound that guarantees an (, δ)− probabilistic
DP guarantee where δ contracts onto 0 for n sufficiently large. We are able to
increase the rate of contraction by truncating the weight, α∗i = 0 if the weighted
log likelihood contribution, αi × fθ(xi) > M , where M becomes the targeted
global point of contraction.
Our pseudo posterior mechanism has the feature that it accommodates any
synthesizer model formulated by the statistical agency and offers a simple weight-
ing scheme that guarantees a pDP result. The simple weighting allows the pos-
terior sampling scheme devised for the non-private synthesizer to be utilized for
synthesis with minor modification for the pDP pseudo posterior mechanism.
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Appendix A: Proofs for Theoretical Results in Section 2
A.1. Proof for Theorem 1
We begin by stating an enabling result that connects the global Lipschitz bound,
∆α, to the KL divergence between the posterior densities (given x versus y) from
the inclusion of a database record.
Theorem 3. ∀x,y ∈ Xn : δ(x,y) = 1 and α(·) with ∆α > 0 satisfying As-
sumption 1,
sup
x,y∈Xn:δ(x,y)=1
DKL
[
(ξα(x)(· | x) ‖ ξα(y)(· | y))
]
≤ 2∆α, (19)
where DKL((P ‖ Q)) =
∫
Xn ln
dP
dQdP .
Proof.
DKL
[
(ξα(x)(· | x) ‖ ξα(y)(· | y))
]
=
∫
Θ
ln
dξα(x)(θ | x)
dξα(y)(θ | y)dξ
α(x)(θ | x)
=
∫
Θ
ln
p
α(x)
θ (x)
p
α(y)
θ (y)
dξα(x)(θ | x) +
∫
Θ
ln
φα(y)(y)
φα(x)(x)
dξα(x)(θ | x)
≤
∫
Θ
∣∣∣∣∣ln pα(x)θ (x)pα(y)θ (y)
∣∣∣∣∣dξα(x)(θ | x) +
∫
Θ
ln
φα(y)(y)
φα(x)(x)
dξα(x)(θ | x)
≤ ∆α +
∣∣∣∣ln φα(y)(y)φα(x)(x)
∣∣∣∣ (20)
From Assumption 1, p
α(x)
θ (x) ≤ exp(∆α)pα(y)θ (y),∀θ ∈ Θ, so
φα(y)(y) =
∫
Θ
p
α(y)
θ (y)dξ(θ) ≤ exp(∆α)
∫
Θ
p
α(x)
θ (x)dξ(θ) = exp(∆α)φ
α(x),
(21)
which gives
sup
x,y∈Xn:δ(x,y)=1
DKL
[
(ξα(x)(· | x) ‖ ξα(y)(· | y))
]
≤ 2∆α. (22)
A.1.1. Proof of Theorem 1
From Assumption 1,
p
α(x)
θ (x)
p
α(y)
θ (y)
≤ exp(∆α). From Theorem 3, we show φα(y)(y) ≤
exp(∆α)φ
α(x)(x). Then, ∀x ∈ Xn and for each x, ∀y ∈ Xn : δ(x,y = 1),
ξα(x)(B | x) =
∫
B
p
α(x)
θ (x)
p
α(y)
θ (y)
p
α(y)
θ (y)dξ(θ)
φα(y)(y)
· φ
α(y)(y)
φα(x)(x)
≤ exp(2∆α)ξα(y)(B | y). (23)
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A.2. Proof for Lemma 1
Pα(x)(ζ ∈ C | x) =
∫
P (ζ ∈ C | x, θ)dξα(x)(θ | x)
=
∫
P (ζ ∈ C | θ)dξα(x)(θ | x)
=
∫
P (ζ ∈ C | θ)dξ
α(x)(θ | x)
dξα(y)(θ | y)dξ
α(y)(θ | y)
≤ e
∫
P (ζ ∈ C | θ)dξα(y)(θ | y)
= ePα(y)(ζ ∈ C | y). (24)
A.3. Proof for Lemma 2
Choose a data set x ∈ Xn. Then let y be a data set such that y ∈ Xn and
the Hamming distance δ(x,y) = 1 .We can express every such y as y =
(x1, x2, . . . , xj−1, yj , xj+1, . . . , xn), where all but the jth element matches be-
tween x and y: xi = yi for i 6= j and xj 6= yj . Then for each θ ∈ Θ:
`α(θ) = sup
x,y∈Xn:δ(x,y)=1
∣∣∣fα(x)θ (x)− fα(y)θ (y)∣∣∣
= sup
xj ,yj∈X
∣∣∣fα(xj)θ (xj)− fα(yj)θ (yj)∣∣∣ (25)
≤
∣∣∣∣sup
z∈X
f
α(z)
θ (z)− infz∈X f
α(z)
θ (z)
∣∣∣∣
Under the assumption p(x) ≤ 1, the last quantity becomes∣∣∣∣sup
z∈X
f
α(z)
θ (z)− infz∈X f
α(z)
θ (z)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣0− infz∈X fα(z)θ (z)
∣∣∣∣
= sup
z∈X
∣∣∣fα(z)θ (z)∣∣∣ (26)
= `αloo(θ).
If we allow for the unusual case that a density p(x) > 1 for some x ∈ X , then
the bound is larger but still related to the leave-one-out formulation:∣∣∣∣sup
z∈X
f
α(z)
θ (z)− infz∈X f
α(z)
θ (z)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣sup
z∈X
f
α(z)
θ (z)
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣ infz∈X fα(z)θ (z)
∣∣∣∣
= sup
z∈X
∣∣∣fα(z)θ (z)∣∣∣+ sup
z∈X
∣∣∣fα(z)θ (z)∣∣∣ (27)
= 2`αloo(θ).
where supz∈X
∣∣∣fα(z)θ (z)∣∣∣ = max{∣∣∣supz∈X fα(z)θ (z)∣∣∣, ∣∣∣infz∈X fα(z)θ (z)∣∣∣}.
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A.4. Proof of Theorem 2
Let us the define the following subset of θ ∈ Θ,
Un =
{
θ ∈ Θ :
[
(1− αm)D(nA)θ0,α (θ, θ∗) + (1− α(n))D
(nQ)
θ0,1−
(θ, θ∗)
]
≥ (D + 3t)nτ2n
}
,
which is the restricted set for which we will bound the pseudo posterior distribu-
tion, ξα (Un | x), from above to achieve the result of Theorem 2. We begin with
the statement and proof of Lemma 3 that extends Lemma 8.1 of Ghosal et al.
[7] to our α−pseudo posterior in order to provide a concentration inequality to
probabilistically (in Pθ0−probability) bound the denominator of the α−pseudo
posterior distribution, ξα (Un | x), from below.
A.4.1. Enabling Lemma
Lemma 3. (Concentration Inequality) Suppose Assumption 3 holds. Define
αm = maxi∈An αi and αl = mini∈An αi. For every τn > 0 and measure Π on
the set Bn (θ
∗, ξ; θ0), we have for every C∗1 =
√
2 + C21 + C
2
3 , and n sufficiently
large,
Pθ0

∫
θ∈Bn
e−rn,α(θ,θ
∗)ξ (dθ) ≤ e−αm(D+t)nτ2n
 ≤ (1 + α2l )(C∗1 )2α2m × 1(D + t− 1)2nτ2n ,
(28)
where the above probability is taken with the respect to Pθ0 .
Proof. The proof follows that of Savitsky and Toth [15] by bounding the proba-
bility expression on left-hand size of Equation (28). We construct anα−weighted
empirical distribution that we will need for the proof with,
Pn,α =
1
n
n∑
i=1
αiδ (xi) , (29)
where δ(xi) denotes the Dirac delta function with probability mass 1 at xi.
We construct the associated scaled and centered empirical process, Gn,α =√
n (Pn,α − Pθ0). The usual equally-weighted empirical distribution, Pn = 1n
∑n
i=1 δ (xi)
and associated, Gn =
√
n (Pn − Pθ0) may be viewed as special cases. We may
define the associated expectation functionals with respect to the α−weighted
empirical distribution by Pn,αg = 1n
∑n
i=1 αig (xi).
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Using Jensen’s inequality,
log
∫
θ∈Bn
n∏
i=1
[
pθi
pθ∗i
(Xi)
]αi
ξ (dθ)
≥
n∑
i=1
∫
θ∈Bn
αi log
pθi
pθ∗i
ξ (dθ)
= nPn,α
∫
θ∈Bn
log
pθ
pθ∗
ξ (dθ)
(30)
We may use the above to now bound the left-hand size of Equation (28)
Pθ0

∫
θ∈Bn
e−rn,α(θ,θ
∗)ξ (dθ) ≤ e−αm(D+t)nτ2n
 (31a)
≤ Pθ0
nPn,α
∫
θ∈Bn
log
pθ
pθ∗
ξ (dθ) ≤ −αm(D + t)nτ2n
 (31b)
= Pθ0
Gn,α
∫
θ∈Bn
log
pθ
pθ∗
ξ (dθ) ≤ −αm(D + t)nτ2n −
√
nPθ0 log
pθ
pθ∗
ξ (dθ)

(31c)
≤ Pθ0
Gn,α
∫
θ∈Bn
log
pθ
pθ∗
ξ (dθ) ≤ −αm(D + t)
√
nτ2n −
√
nτ2n
 (31d)
= Pθ0
Gn,α
∫
θ∈Bn
log
pθ
pθ∗
ξ (dθ) ≤ −αm(D + t− 1)
√
nτ2n
 , (31e)
where the bound in Equation (31d) uses the prior mass result from Assump-
tion 3. We proceed to use Chebyshev to bound the resultant probability, as
follows:
Pθ0
Gn,α
∫
θ∈Bn
log
pθ
pθ∗
ξ (dθ) ≤ −αm(D + t− 1)
√
nτ2n

≤
∫
θ∈Bn
[
EPθ0
(
Gn,α log pθpθ∗
)2]
ξ (dθ)
α2m(D + t− 1)2nτ4n
, (32)
where we have applied Fubini to the right side of Equation (32) to move the
expectation through the integral. We now proceed to further bound the expres-
sion in brackets on the right-hand side of Equation (32) from above. We may
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decompose the expectation, as follows
EPθ0
(
Gn,α log
pθ
pθ∗
)2
≤ nEPθ0
(
Pn,α log
pθ
pθ∗
− Pn log pθ
pθ∗
)2
+EPθ0
(
Gn,α log
pθ
pθ∗
)2
(33)
We first bound the second term on the right,
EPθ0
(
Gn,α log
pθ
pθ∗
)2
(34a)
≤ EPθ0
(√
nPn,α log
pθ
pθ∗
)2
(34b)
≤ EPθ0
(
1√
n
n∑
i=1
log
pθ
pθ∗
)2
(34c)
≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
EPθ0
(
log
pθ
pθ∗
)2
(34d)
≤ 1
n
× nτ2n = τ2n, (34e)
where we use independence of the Xi to establish the fourth equation and As-
sumption 3 to achieve the fifth equation.
We proceed to further simplify the bound in the first term on the right in
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Equation (33):
nEPθ0
(
Pn,α log
pθ
pθ∗
− Pn log pθ
pθ∗
)2
(35a)
= nEPθ0
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
(αi − 1) log pθi
pθ∗i
)2
(35b)
=
1
n
n∑
i,j=1
EPθ0
[
(αi − 1) (αj − 1) log pθi
pθ∗i
(Xi) log
pθ,j
pθ∗,j
(Xj)
]
(35c)
=
1
n
n∑
i=j=1
EPθ0
[
(αi − 1)2 log pθi
pθ∗i
(Xi)
2
]
+
1
n
n∑
i6=j=1
EPθ0
∣∣∣∣[(αi − 1) (αj − 1) log pθipθ∗i (Xi) log pθ,jpθ∗,j (Xj)
]∣∣∣∣
(35d)
≤ 1
n
(1− αl)2
n∑
i6=j=1
EPθ0
[
log
pθi
pθ∗i
(Xi)
2
]
+
1
n
(1− αl)2
∑
i 6=j∈An
∣∣∣∣EPθ0 log pθipθ∗i (Xi) log pθ,jpθ∗,j (Xj)
∣∣∣∣
+
1
n
(
1− α(n)
)2 ∑
i6=j∈Qn
∣∣∣∣EPθ0 log pθipθ∗i (Xi) log pθ,jpθ∗,j (Xj)
∣∣∣∣
(35e)
≤ 1
n
{
(1− αl)2 nτ2n
}
+
1
n
(1− αl)2
(
C21n− C1
√
n
)
τ2n + nQ
C23τ
2
n
nQ
(35f)
=
{
(1− αl)2 τ2n
}
+ (1− αl)2 C21τ2n + C23τ2n, (35g)
for sufficiently large n. The bound in Equation (35f) results from the restriction
of θ to Bn (θ
∗, η; θ0) and also from Assumption 4 that regulates the growth of
the number of αi < 1
− and the magnitude of (1− α(n)).
We may now bound the expectation on the right-hand size of Equation (32),
EPθ0
(
Gn,α log
pθ
pθ∗
)2
≤
{
(1− αl)2 τ2n
}
(1− αl)2 C21τ2n + τ2n (36a)
≤ {(1− 2αl + α2l ) τ2n + (1− 2αl + α2l )C21τ2n + C23ηn2 + τ2n}
(36b)
≤ (2 + C21 + C23 )τ2n + (1 + C21 )α2l τ2n ≤ (1 + αl)2(C∗1 )2τ2n
(36c)
for n sufficiently large, where we set C∗1 :=
√
C21 + C
2
3 + 2. This concludes the
proof.
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A.4.2. Proof of Theorem 2
We begin by constructing the α−pseudo posterior distribution on the set, Un,
ξα (Un | x) =
∫
Un
e−rn,α(θ,θ
∗)ξ(dθ)∫
Θ
e−rn,α(θ,θ∗)ξ(dθ)
. (37)
We next bound the numerator from above in Pθ0− probability.
EPθ0
∫
Un
e−rn,α(θ,θ
∗)ξ(dθ) (38a)
=
∫
Un
A
(n)
θ0,α
(θ, θ∗) ξ(dθ) (38b)
=
∫
Un
e−
∑n
i=1(1−αi)Dθ0,α,iξ(dθ) (38c)
≤
∫
Un
e−(1−αm)
∑
i∈An Dθ0,α,i−(1−α
(n))
∑
i∈Qn Dθ0,1−,i ξ(dθ) (38d)
≤ e−(D+3t)nτ2n , (38e)
where we use Fubini to switch the order of expectation and integration in Equa-
tion (38b). We achieve the bound in Equation (38d) since Dθ0,α,i > 0, ∀i ∈
(1, . . . , n) and Bhattacharya et al. [3] shows that D
(n)
θ0,1−
(θ, θ∗) is finite and
contracts on the KL divergence. The final bound uses the definition of Un.
We proceed to use the Markov inequality and the definition for Un to achieve
the numerator bound with respect to Pθ0−probability,
Pθ0

∫
Un
e−rn,α(θ,θ
∗)ξ(dθ) ≥ e−(D+2t)nτ2n
 (39a)
≤ e
−(D+3t)nτ2n
e−(D+2t)nτ2n
= e−tnτ
2
n ≤ (1 + α
2
l )(C
∗
1 )
2
α2m(D − 1 + t)2nτ2n
. (39b)
We, next, turn to bounding the denominator of Equation (37), from below.
Since, ∫
θ∈Θ
e−rn,α(θ,θ
∗)ξ(dθ) ≥
∫
θ∈Bn
e−rn,α(θ,θ
∗)ξ(dθ),
we may use the result of Lemma 3 in,
Pθ0

∫
θ∈Θ
e−rn,α(θ,θ
∗)ξ(dθ) ≥ e−αm(D+t)nτ2n
 > 1− (1 + α2l )(C∗1 )2α2m(D − 1 + t)2nτ2n . (40)
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Finally, combining the results of Equations (37), (39) and (40): With prob-
ability at least 1− [2/(D + t− 1)2nτ2n × (1 + α2l (C∗1 )2)/α2m],
ξα
([
(1− αm)D(nA)θ0,α (θ, θ∗) + (1− α(n))D
(nQ)
θ0,1−
(θ, θ∗)
]
≥ (D + 3t)nτ2n
∣∣x) ≤
e−(D+2t)nτ
2
neαm(D+t)nτ
2
n
≤ e−tnτ2n
Appendix B: Unweighted, Non-private Synthesizer
Our description of the unweighted, non-private synthesizer follows closely of that
in Hu and Savitsky [8]. To simulate partially synthetic data for the CE sample,
where only the sensitive, continuous family income variable is synthesized, we
propose using a flexible, parametric finite mixture synthesizer.
Equation (41) and Equation (42) present the first two levels of the hierarchical
parametric finite mixture synthesizer: yi is the logarithm of the family income for
CU i, and xi is the R×1 predictor vector for CU i. The finite mixture utilizes a
hyperparameter for the maximum number of mixture components (i.e., clusters),
K, that is to set to be over-determined to permit the flexible clustering of CUs.
A subset of CUs that are assigned to cluster, k, employ the same generating
parameters for y, (β∗k , σ
∗
k), that we term a “location”. Locations, (β
∗,σ∗), and
the n× 1 vector of cluster indicators, zi ∈ (1, · · · ,K), are all sampled for each
CU, i ∈ (1, . . . , n).
yi | Xi, zi,B∗,σ∗ ∼ Normal(yi | x′iβ∗zi , σ∗zi), (41)
zi | pi ∼ Multinomial(1;pi1, · · · , piK), (42)
where the K × R matrix of regression locations, B∗ = (β∗1 , . . . ,β∗K)
′
, denote
cluster-indexed regression coefficients for R predictors. The (pi1, . . . , piK) are, in
turn, assigned a sparsity inducing Dirichlet distribution with hyperparameters
specified as α/K for α ∈ R+. We next describe our prior specification.
We induce sparsity in the number of clusters with,
(pi1, . . . , piK) ∼ Dirichlet
( α
K
, . . . ,
α
K
)
, (43)
α ∼ Gamma(aα, bα). (44)
We specify multivariate Normal priors for each regression coefficient vector
of coefficient locations, β∗k,
β∗k
iid∼ MVNR(0,diag(σβ)×
R×R
Ωβ ×diag(σβ)), (45)
where the R×R correlation matrix, Ωβ , receives a uniform prior over the space
of R × R correlation matrices, and each component of σβ receives a Student-t
prior with 3 degrees of freedom,
σ∗k
iid∼ t(3, 0, 1). (46)
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We proceed to describe how to generate partially synthetic data for the CE
sample. To implement the finite mixture synthesizer, we first generate sample
values of (pi(l),β∗,(l),σ∗,(l)) from the posterior distribution at MCMC iteration
l. Second, for CU i, we generate cluster assignments, z
(l)
i , from its full conditional
posterior distribution given in Hu and Savitsky [8] using the posterior samples of
pi(l). Lastly, we generate synthetic family income for CU i, y
∗,(l)
i , from Equation
(41) given xi, and samples of z
(l)
i ,β
∗,(l) and σ∗,(l). We perform these draws for
all n CUs, and obtain a partially synthetic dataset, Z(l) at MCMC iteration l.
We repeat this process for m times, creating m independent partially synthetic
datasets Z = (Z(1), · · · ,Z(m)).
Appendix C: Global DP via a Censored Pseudo Likelihood
A possible alternative to relying on the asymptotic contraction of θ ∈ Θ (at
θ∗) to achieve a global privacy guarantee at large samples, n, is to explore
the use of censoring the log-likelihood at some threshold, Mx, that is selected
independently of any particularly dataset, but rather based on a history of
experience with the class of data; we provide examples of local results with
attractive risk and utility performances on our real data application to the
CE sample in the sequel. The use of censoring would “lock in” any chosen 
under an − DP formal privacy guarantee by choosing the  independently
of the observed dataset. The censored threshold will determine the Lipschitz
bound, ∆, which will indirectly set the  = 2∆ guarantee. The subsequent −
DP privacy guarantee such that for all subsequent samples of sizes ≥ n, the
privacy guarantee would be fixed without relying on asymptotics. This method
constructs the pseudo likelihood as,
pαc (xi | θ) =
 exp(Mx), p(xi | θ)
α > exp(Mx),
exp(−Mx), p(xi | θ)α < exp(−Mx),
p(xi | θ)α, otherwise,
for use in
ξαc (θ | x) ∝
n∏
i=1
pαc (xi | θ)ξ(θ). (47)
Just for illustration in this example we set the threshold Mx = ∆α,x, which
makes ∆α ≤ ∆α,x over the space of databases, x ∈ Xn, ∀n ∈ N such that
the global DP privacy guarantee,  ≤ ∆α,x. In practice, we would not use a
particular dataset for choosing , but here it allows us to compare thresholding
to asymptotics.
While this formulation of fαc (xi | θ) = log pαc (xi | θ) is simple, it can lead
to serious computational issues. For many combinations of {xi, θ}, the censored
likelihood cannot discriminate between better and worse fit. These can lead
optimization and rejection sampling algorithms to drift. One alternative is to
use a strictly monotonic transformation such as the arc tangent,
fαac(x | θ) =
(
2Mx
pi
)
arctan
(
f(x | θ)α
(
pi
2Mx
)
− µx
)
+ µx. (48)
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The transformation g(f |Mx, µx) has the property that g(µx |Mx, µx) = µx
with local slope g′(µx | Mx, µx) = 1 and that limMx→∞ g(f | Mx, µx) = f .
Together these properties mean that g(f) is a good local approximation to f in
the neighborhood of µx and converges to the original f as the bounds increase
towards ∞. It is also clear that g(f) is strictly monotonic, so optimization and
rejection sampling approaches can still be viable. Figure 8 displays the mapping
g(f |Mx = 100, µx = 0) which respects the Mx bounds globally while still being
reasonably close to f for small and moderate values of f .
−500
−250
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500
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f
g(f
)
−100
−50
0
50
100
−100 −50 0 50 100
f
g(f
)
Fig 8. The bounded tranformation g(f | Mx = 100, µx = 0) (solid) and one-to-one line
(dashed red) for bounds ±Mx = 100 (dotted blue). Zoom out (left), zoom in (right).
C.1. Simulation Study
To demonstrate the risk-utility trade-off for a non-asymptotic global bound we
use Equation (48) to estimate the posterior of the mean parameter from a Pois-
son data generating distribution across different fixed boundsM = {1, 2, 5, 10, 100}
and sample sizes n = {100, 1000}. We provide a simple, Monte Carlo simulation
study to demonstrate the process of taking a result based on a local estimate
of a Lipschitz bound on a single, observed dataset and applying it to repeated
generation of new datasets such that analysis of these subsequent datasets have
Lipschitz bounds at or below that of the original dataset under use of the arc-
tan censoring mechanism of Equation (48). We compare the distributions of
Lipschitz bounds for the unweighted posterior, the α−weighted pseudo poste-
rior and the arctan censoring (that embeds the α−weighted pseudo posterior)
mechanisms. We also compare their utility performances to preserve key charac-
teristics of the true data distribution. As earlier discussed, guaranteeing a finite
non-asymptotic global result under the arctan censoring mechanism leads to
additional loss in utility, although this loss is mitigated at larger sample sizes.
Using the simple means model for Poisson distributed data, y ∼ Pois(µ)
(with µ = 50) our procedure for locking in a local result, globally, is the follow-
ing:
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1. Generate one base set of y0 = {y1, . . . y100} under sample size n = 100 (or
n = 1000) as our observed dataset.
2. Compute the maximum local Lipschitz, ∆α,y0 , for the local database un-
der the α−weighted pseudo posterior mechanism for estimating µ.
3. For j = 1, . . . , 100:
• Generate yj ∼ Pois(µ), each of size n = 100 (or n = 1000).
• Compute the local Lipschitz bound for the unweighted andα−weighted
pseudo posterior mechanisms without the arctan transformation.
• Use the arctan transformation of Equation (48) that embeds the
α−weighted pseudo posterior as our mechanism under each of M =
{∆α,y0 , 1.5∆α,y0 , 2∆α,y0}.
Figure 9 compares the distributions across the J = 100 replications. The
α−weighted pseudo posterior mechanism (without embedding in the arctan
censoring), labeled “Weighted”, produces a marked decrease in local maximum
Lipschitz compared to the unweighted (labeled “Unweighted”). The local ∆α,y0
bound for our observed dataset, y0, is close to the mode of the 100 Monte Carlo
simulated weighted Lipschitz bounds. So, while there is a contraction of the local
Lipschitz bounds for the Weighted result under α vectorized weighting, a given
local ∆α,y0 is not strictly an upper bound. In contrast, using M = ∆α,y0 with
censoring (labeled with prefix, “Wt”) does ensure all realized local Lipschitz
bounds are below the local Lipschitz bound, ∆α,y0 , but at the cost of reduced
utility (90th quantile is shifted). Using slightly larger bounds (1.5∆α,y0 and
2∆α,y0) recovers some of the utility at the expense of looser global guaranteed
bounds. The top plot in Figure 10 reveals, however, that the distributions of the
local log-likelihoods are all well below the guaranteed global Lipschitz bound,
Mx, which indicates that the censoring bound is somewhat inefficient.
To compare asymptotic versus censored bounds, we repeat the simulation
above using sample size n = 1000. Figure 10 demonstrates that the local Lip-
schitz bounds for the unweighted likelihood increases (or drifts) with larger
sample sizes. The α−weighted log-pseudo likelihood shows a pronounced de-
crease in drift, with only a slightly larger bound for n = 1000, indicating an
asymptotic contraction of the local result towards a global result.
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Fig 9. Distribution of the maximum observed Lipschitz bound ∆y (top) to threshold bounds M
(dashed) and estimates of the 90th quantile of the mean parameter µ (bottom) from posterior
samples of (left to right) unweighted, weighted, and weighted with global bounds. Based on
100 realizations of size 100.
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Fig 10. Distribution of the maximum observed Lipschitz bound ∆y by sample size (100, 1000)
from 100 realizations of posterior samples of (left to right) unweighted, weighted, and weighted
with global bounds. Dashed lines use n = 1000 for baseline M , dotted lines use n = 100. Top
lines (U) are for unweighted local M , bottom lines (W) are weighted local M .
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